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INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) in response to the painful plight of employees losing
their anticipated retirement benefits for the simple lack of soundness
and stability in their companies' retirement plans.' Through ERISA,
Congress sought to protect employees by requiring employers to disclose and report to plan participants financial and other information
regarding plan benefits. 2 ERISA further established a code of conduct-standards designed to set out the responsibilities and obligations of the employer as a plan fiduciary.3 At the same time, Congress
acknowledged that employers who offer retirement benefits serve in a
dual capacity, both as a plan's administrator and as a plan beneficiary's employer (i.e., an employer-fiduciary). 4 Serving in this dual capacity subjects the employer-fiduciary to conflicting loyalties: a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries versus the "best interests" loyalty it owes the company.5 One such type of conflict, to
which this Comment is limited, arises in cases where a retired employee believes his or her employer failed to disclose, upon request,
potential retirement plan benefit changes.6
Consider the following scenario: Company Z has in place a standard
retirement plan for its employees. Over the years, it has been company policy that anyone wishing to retire, who meets the plan's requirements, need only file the proper retirement forms with the
company's personnel office. Over the last couple of months, because
of the downturn in the economy and reduced sales in its widgets,
Company Z has been considering ways to reduce its expenses, including the possibility of offering a new early retirement plan to employees with more than 21 years on-the-job. Company Z has narrowed its
review of various plan proposals to two likely candidates. At the same
time, Employee A, who has worked at Company Z for 24 years, has
been thinking about retiring and asks his immediate supervisor if
there are any plans to offer early retirement incentives to the existing
retirement plan. If so, Employee A would like to take advantage of
any such enhanced plan. The supervisor does not know and suggests
that Employee A check with the personnel office. Employee A meets
with a personnel office representative who tells him that there is no
current plan to offer an early retirement incentive. Employee A de1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
3. See id.
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).
5. See Melissa Elaine Stover, Maintaining ERISA's Balance: The Fundamental
Business Decisions v. The Affirmative Duty to Disclose Proposed Changes, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 689, 690 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1157 (6th Cir. 1988)
(noting employer failed to disclose second, more lucrative retirement plan to retiring
employees).
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cides to retire and completes the necessary paperwork. Two weeks
after Employee A retires, Company Z offers an early retirement incentive, which includes, in addition to its standard retirement package,
an additional year of pay for any employee who agrees to take early
retirement.
This scenario brings to mind two important questions. First, does
Company Z, if it chooses to speak about prospective plan changes,
have a fiduciary duty to truthfully represent (i.e., not to misrepresent)
those changes? Second, if such a duty exists, at what point does that
duty arise?
In answering the above questions, this Comment examines the current state of the law on these related issues. A review of ERISA will
show that securing employee retirement plans was one of Congress's
primary concerns in implementing the statute. 7 As to the first issue,
those circuit courts that have considered the issue all agree that once
an employer-fiduciary chooses to communicate about the future of a
participant's plan benefits, the employer-fiduciary has a fiduciary duty
to refrain from making misrepresentations.' However, the courts are
split on the second issue-when does that duty arise? 9 A majority of
the circuit courts agree that the duty to speak truthfully arises once
the plan is under "serious consideration"; 10 while a minority argues
that this bright-line test is too rigid and a more fact-specific approach
is required.1 1 This Comment concludes that the minority's fact-specific approach is the better standard and modestly proposes it should
be adopted by the United States Supreme Court as the best test in
evaluating breach of employer-fiduciary duties under ERISA because
it brings into balance the dual duties of the employer-fiduciary 12 and
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) (codifying ERISA fiduciary duties under the
prudent man standard of care); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (citing
Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir.
1983) ("Lying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA")); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407,
424 (5th Cir. 2003).
9. Compare Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996) (establishing affirmative duty to tell the truth arises when plan is under serious consideration) with Martinez, 338 F.3d at 428 and Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117,
124 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting serious consideration standard for a more fact-specific
approach).
10. See McAuley v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043-45 (6th Cir.
1999); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997); Hockett v. Sun
Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997); Fischer, 96 F.3d at 1538-41; Muse v. Int'l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d
Cir. 1993); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992); Berlin,
858 F.2d at 1163-64.
11. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 425; Ballone, 109 F.3d at 124 (rejecting serious consideration standard for a more fact- specific approach).
12. See discussion infra, Part V (discussing the dual duties of the employerfiduciary).
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meets Congress's goal of preventing serious abuse in the managing of
employee retirement benefit programs. 3
In sum, this Comment examines whether ERISA imposes an affirmative obligation on employer-fiduciaries to disclose proposed
changes in their employee benefits plans and when that duty to disclose arises. Part II provides a historical perspective of ERISA and
the duty to disclose. Part III examines when an employer is considered a fiduciary under ERISA. Part IV explains ERISA's reporting
and disclosure requirements and its impact on the duty to disclose
proposed changes. Part V takes into consideration the duty of loyalty.
Part VI analyzes the two conflicting standards. Ultimately, after a detailed analysis, Part VII of this Comment concludes that the minority's
fact-specific approach is the better standard in evaluating breach of
employer fiduciary duties under ERISA.
II.

THE HISTORY OF

ERISA

In order to put the conflicting standards concerning an employer's
duty to disclose to early retirement plans into perspective, a bit of
background appears necessary. This section takes a look at ERISA14 -prior to and subsequent to its enactment by Congress in 1974.
A.

Pre-ERISA

As Frank Cummings succinctly remarked, "Why bother with this
history? Didn't ERISA wipe it all out? Not quite."1 5 To understand
why Congress enacted ERISA, it is important to understand the reasons why the statute was enacted in the first place. Prior to Congress's
enactment of ERISA, state courts applied common-law trust principles to both trustees and other fiduciaries of pension and welfare benefit plans,' 6 resulting in a "mind-boggling" array of "conflicts and
7
choice-of-law questions.""1
As Cummings noted, before ERISA,
[t]here frequently was no way to accomplish service on or jurisdiction over all the necessary parties to a pension or benefit plan ....
[T]here were too many parties in too many places: the trustee, insurer, employer, union, beneficiary, administrator, record-keeper,
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
14. See generally id.
15. See Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation:An Overview of Major Claims and
Defenses, 1 ALI-ABA EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LITIGATION 1, 7 (2003).
16. See id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 4-5 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643 (indicating a few states had codified existing principles of
trust law).
17. Cummings, supra note 15, at 7. In a pension dispute, commonly the trustee,

the company, the plan administrator, the union, the insurance company, "members of
the joint board of plan," and the plan actuary were all necessary parties to the dispute.

Id. at 7, n.23.
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investment advisor, actuary, and accountant
all might be (and fre8
quently were) in different states.'
Under traditional state law, fiduciary equity standards applied only to
a trustee. 19 However, often times it was the employers, unions, plan
administrators, and actuaries-those who did not have fiduciary status
under state law (but had the real decision making power)-who managed and administered the plan."° Undoubtedly, it made such cases
both difficult and costly to litigate.
In 1958, based on the theory that by informing plan participants of
their rights, plan participants would have the necessary information to
police their own plans without further governmental interference, 1
Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
(WPPDA).22 Congress adopted the WPPDA "purportedly to protect
the interest of welfare and pension plan participants and beneficiaries
2' ' 3
through disclosure of information with respect to such plans.
Under the WPPDA, plan administrators were required to file with the
Secretary of Labor and, upon written request, send to plan participants a copy of the plan description and annual report.2 4 However,
the lack of governmental investigative and remedial powers destined
the WPPDA to fail. 25 Congress went back to the drawing board seeking a way to ensure that employers kept their pension promises, while
at the same time balancing the needs of plan participants against the

costs of administering such plans.2 6 In 1974, it delivered ERISAbringing the issue firmly under federal law.

18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. A trustee has a general disclosure requirement "to communicate to the
beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the
beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection

in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest."
OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

21. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4642.

22.

WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE

ACT,Publ. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat.

997 (1958) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09) (repealed by ERISA, 1975)
(controlling the disclosure requirements of pensions and welfare benefit plans where
a company employed more than 25 employees). Prior to ERISA, where a company
employed more than 25 employees, the WPPDA controlled disclosure requirements
of pension and welfare benefit plans. Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Responsibility
Under ERISA: Is There Ever a FiduciaryDuty To Disclose?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 979,
985 at n.21 (1993).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
24. Id. In 1962, Congress amended the WPPDA making "theft, embezzlement,
bribery, and kickbacks federal crimes" when connected with pension and welfare
plans. Id.
25. Id. The 1962 amendments to the WPPDA further provided "limited investigatory and regulatory powers upon the Secretary of Labor." Id. (emphasis added).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Dangerof Ignoring Plain Meaning: Individual Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41
WAYNE L. REV. 1233, 1238 (1995) (noting 1963 Studebaker plant closing and subse-
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ERISA

After years of redrafting and compromise, Congress finally enacted
an extensive regulatory scheme-ERISA.27 Congress's reasoning for
enacting ERISA appears to be two-fold. First and foremost, Congress
designed ERISA to protect employee pensions and other benefits by

providing insurance (for vested pension rights),28 specifying certain

plan characteristics in detail,29 and by setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of both pensions and
nonpension benefit plans.3 0 Second, Congress designed ERISA to encourage employers to voluntarily provide such plans to their
employees.3 1
The most important aspect of ERISA from the historical perspec-

tive is the fact that "the key decision-makers are all defined, as a matter of federal law, as fiduciaries.

'3 2

In doing so, Congress resolved

many of the pre-ERISA procedural problems in litigating employee
benefit cases and, in turn, provided new procedural requirements and
opportunities.3 3

III.

FIDUCIARY DEFINED

By legal definition, the term "fiduciary" is a concoction of law and
fact.3 4 Generally, ERISA states that "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent" that such person or entity: (i) exercises
discretionary3 5 authority or control over the plan, including management or plan asset disposition; (ii) provides plan investment advice for
payment; or (iii) has any administrative discretionary authority or requent failure of auto workers' seriously underfunded pension plan as one of the significant events prompting passage of ERISA).
27. See Stover, supra note 5, at 715 n.138.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
29. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-60 (specifying when and how pensions vest).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
33. See Cummings, supra note 15, at 8-9; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024-25 (2000);
Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 111
F.3d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting an implicit requirement that all plan administrative
remedies be exhausted by plaintiff prior to filing suit).
34. Reich v. Lancaster, 55 F.3d 1034, 1044 (5th Cir. 1995).
35. According to several circuit courts, a close reading of the literal language and
structure of ERISA, subsection (i) of § 1002(21)(A), suggests that the term "discretionary" is to be given effect in the first clause and not in the third since discretion is
not required of a fiduciary where such person exercises any administrative authority
or responsibility over the plan. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 544
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Bricklayers Local 6 Welfare Fund v. Wettlin
Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins.
Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A]ny control over disposition of plan
money makes the person who has control a fiduciary."))).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol11/iss1/11
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V11.I1.9

6

Will the Correct
Legal Standard Please
StepUNDER
Forward: When
Should
2004]Sprott:
EMPLOYER'S
AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY
ERISA
195

sponsibility over the plan.3 6 In § 3(21)(A) of ERISA, the phrase fiduciary with respect to a plan is defined functionally in terms of authority
and control.37 In turn, the phrase to the extent narrows the definition
of a fiduciary to those parts of the plan "over which the person or
entity exercises authority and control., 38 Thus, an employer's
"[f]iduciary status [under ERISA] is not an all or nothing proposition,' 39 and should be construed liberally, keeping in mind ERISA's
objectives and policies.4 0 In contrast, ERISA defines a formally
named fiduciary as:
[A] fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant
to a procedure specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary: (i)
by a person who is an employer or employee organization with respect to the plan, or (ii) by such an employer and such an employee
organization acting jointly.4 '
As such, certain positions are, without question, defined as fiduciary
positions under the statute. However, ERISA also permits a plan
document to name a fiduciary for a limited function and, as such, will
have fiduciary status for that particular function only.42
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Thus, under ERISA, § 3(21)(A), fiduciary obligations can apply to managing, advising, and administering an ERISA plan. See In re
Enron Corp. Sec., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
37. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (quoting Ariz. State
Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96 (1993) and
quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (indicating fiduciary status
is defined "'in functional terms of control and authority over the plan, .. . thus expanding the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties--and to damages-under
§ 409(a)"'))); see also Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 958 F.
Supp. 869, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 262 (1993) ("Unlike the common law definition under which fiduciary status is
determined by virtue of the position a person holds, ERISA's definition is
functional.")).
38. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (quoting Sommers Drug Stores
Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1989)).
39. Id. at 544 (citing Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
1998)).
40. Id. at 544 (quoting Ariz. State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund, 125 F.3d at 720);
see also Martin v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 828 F. Supp. 1427, 1436 (D. Alaska 1992)
(indicating fiduciary duties established by ERISA should be broadly construed); Blatt
v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1987) (Congress intended ERISA's
definition of fiduciary "to be broadly construed.").
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); see, e.g., Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that fiduciary duties articulated in ERISA section governing duties of ERISA fiduciary is not exhaustive; rather,
Congress relied upon common law of trusts to define general scope of trustees' and
other fiduciaries' authority and responsibility); Martin v. Walton, 773 F. Supp. 1524,
1526 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting standards of fiduciary conduct for ERISA fiduciaries are
to be governed, interpreted and judicially determined both in light of common-law
trusts, and special nature, purpose and intent of employee benefit plans).
42. See Daniels v. Nat'l Employee Benefit Servs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 684, 690 (N.D.
Ohio 1994). But see Arakelian v. Nat'l Western Life Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp 400, 404
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A corollary to this functional approach of determining fiduciary status is that persons may become plan fiduciaries, even though they
hold no position in regards to the plan, if they exercise de facto control
over a fiduciary function.43 Courts have found such persons to be de
facto fiduciaries in a number of situations," including: when an officer
and owner of a closely held corporation commingled plan assets with
corporate assets and, in turn, used such commingled funds to pay corporation creditors;4 5 when a controlling shareholder and officer failed
to forward participant contributions before the company's failure;4 6
when an employer misappropriated employee contributions to a
plan;4 7 when a person had control over a trustee's decision to sell
stock;48 and when a company's executive board members were responsible for monitoring and supervising the appointed trustee. 4 9 Beyond the functional and de facto methods of determining fiduciary
status, a few courts have imposed fiduciary status and, thus, liability
on individuals-within a corporation or other entity-that actually
perform the functions which make the entity a plan fiduciary.5"
Thus, an employer may be deemed a fiduciary either by functional
and de facto methods, or simply by performing the functions of a fiduciary. However, it is important to remember that an employer wears
(D.D.C. 1987) (holding that where there is only one named fiduciary, that fiduciary is
a fiduciary for all purposes).
43. See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting no express delegation required when persons performing fiduciary-type duties will be considered fiduciaries); see also Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera,
958 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5103:
While the ordinary functions of consultants and advisors to employee benefit
plans... may not be considered as fiduciary functions, it must be recognized
that there will be situations where such consultants and advisers may because of their special expertise, in effect, be exercising discretionary authority or control with respect to the management or administration of such plan
or some authority or control regarding its assets,
and thus, such persons may be regarded as fiduciaries.).
44. See Robert N. Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, 574 PLI/TAx 637,
645 (2003) (giving a more detailed description of situations where courts have found
de facto fiduciaries).
45. See LoPresti v. Terwillinger, 126 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1997).
46. See Bannistor v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 402-07 (5th Cir. 2002).
47. See United States v. Grizzle, 933 F.2d 943, 948 (11th Cir. 1991).
48. See Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 14.60 (5th Cir. 1986).
49. See Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A., 234 F. Supp. 2d 872, 882-83 (C.D. Ill. 2002).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000); Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing
Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Kay v. Thrift & Profit Sharing Plan
for Employees of Boyertown Casket Co., 780 F. Supp. 1447, 1461 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that where "a committee or entity is named as the plan fiduciary, the corporate officers or trustees who carry out the fiduciary functions are themselves fiduciaries and cannot be shielded from liability by the company")). But see Confer v.
Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that officers of a corporate
fiduciary are shielded from fiduciary liability unless they are explicitly or implicitly
delegated individual fiduciary roles).
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dual hats and will not be considered a fiduciary in every instance. Yet,
where an employer is considered a fiduciary, ERISA places upon it
certain reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as other fiduciary duties.
IV.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS,
AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER

ERISA

It is well established that Congress enacted ERISA with the intent
to protect employees' pension benefit rights.5 1 To meet this goal, ERISA provides a detailed regulatory scheme,52 two crucial components
being (1) the disclosure and reporting requirements and (2) the fiduciary duty.53
A.

Reporting and Disclosure Requirements

ERISA provides specific rules regarding the type of information
that must be furnished to participants and beneficiaries and reported
to certain government agencies. 54 ERISA requires that plan administrators file certain informational returns with the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Service, including a summary
plan description that describes the coverage levels and claims procedures of the plan. 56 Plans are also required to report when modifications to the plan have been made.57 Of the numerous forms required
under ERISA, the summary plan description, the summary of material modifications, and the annual report are the most relevant reporting documents ERISA requires to be available for disclosure to both
plan participants and/or the Secretary of Labor.58
The Summary Plan Description (SPD) is central to the ERISA disclosure requirements. 59 The SPD is a summary of provisions of the
plan, including a statement of ERISA rights.6" It is written in language understandable to the average plan participant.6 1 A plan administrator is required to provide the SPD to participants, but is not
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); Stover supra note 5, at 690 (citing 263 CONG.
REc. S15, 762 (1974)).
52. Bintz, supra note 22, at 980.
53. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05, 1021-31 (2000); Bintz, supra note 22, at 980.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (specifying filing and other noticing requirements
under ERISA).
55. See id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE GUIDE
FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS (April 2004) (providing additional information relat-

ing to a plan administrator's disclosure and reporting requirements under ERISA),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf (on file with the Texas Wesleyan

Law Review).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (summary plan description).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (2000).

58. See §§ 1022-29.
59. See §§ 1022, 1024.

60. Id.
61. Id.
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required to file it with the DOL.6 2 The plan administrator must provide a SPD for new plans within 120 days after the plan becomes subject to ERISA.6 3 ERISA requires updates every fifth year for
amended plans; otherwise, the plan administrator is required to redistribute the SPD every ten years. 6" The plan administrator must provide a copy of the SPD to new participants within 90 days of
participation or benefit commencement (for beneficiaries).6 Should
any material modifications to the plan occur or if there is any change
in formation, the plan administrator is required to provide participants, within 210 days after the close of the plan year in which the
modification was adopted, a Summary of Material Modifications
(SSM),6 6 unless described in a timely distributed SPD.6 7

The plan administrator or plan sponsor is also required to provide
to participants a copy of the Summary of Annual Report within nine
months after the close of the plan year, or within two months after the
close of the extension period for filing an annual return.68 The plan
administrator is required to file an annual return within the last day of
the seventh month after the close of the plan year and make the return available to participants upon written request.6 9
ERISA, by requiring that plan administrators share a wide array of
information ranging from coverage levels to financial information
with the plan participants and the DOL, protects plan participants'
disclosure rights. Penalties for failure to meet the reporting and disclosure requirements under ERISA are severe.70 For example, part 1
of Title I of ERISA provides that, upon conviction, a fiduciary may be
fined up to $5,000 ($100,000 maximum if the violator is an entity other
than an individual) and/or imprisoned for up to one year.71
B.

Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA

In addition to ERISA's reporting and disclosure rules, plan administrators have certain fiduciary duties.72 Under ERISA, a plan fiduciary's obligations were designed to protect a plan participant's interests
against the historical abuses in the discretion and management of such
plans by the employer.73 In determining whether an employer is act62. See § 1022.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)(B).
64. § 1024(b).
65. See § 1024(b)(1)(A).
66. See §§ 1022(a), 1024(b)(1).
67. See § 1024(b).
68. §§ 1023(a)(1)(A), 1024(a)(1), 1024(b)(3).
69. § 1024(a)(1).
70. See generally §§ 1131-32 (criminal and civil penalties under ERISA).
71. § 1131.
72. See generally §§ 1101-14.
73. See Justice v. Bankers Trust Co., 607 F. Supp. 527, 533 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Stover, supra note 5, at 698.
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ing in its fiduciary capacity, courts look back to the common law of
trusts as a "starting point" for ERISA analysis. 7 4 The ERISA lan75
guage itself does not explicitly set forth all of the fiduciary duties;
rather, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of its authority and responsibility.7 6 However, ERISA's
own legislative history invokes this limitation, providing that "the
principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing trust77law, but
with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans.
In Section 404(a), ERISA describes three areas of fiduciary responsibility under which employers, when executing their fiduciary duties,
will be subject to liability if they fail to live up to the statute's standards.7 8 The first and most fundamental duty of an ERISA plan fiduciary is a duty of loyalty, which requires fiduciaries to discharge their
duties in regards to a plan "solely in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries." 7 9 Second, fiduciaries must discharge their duties for
"the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries," while at the same time "defraying reasonable expenses
of administering the plan."8 0 Thus, avoiding conflicts of interests is
one of the responsibilities and duties imposed on fiduciaries by ERISA.8 ' Finally, fiduciaries are required to meet a "prudent man" standard by discharging their fiduciary duties with "the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims." 2 Consequently, when an employer is acting in its capacity
74. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999) (citing
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996)).
75. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
76. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 496 (quoting Cent. States, Southwest and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)); see also Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended by § 404(a) to incorporate the
fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA."); Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611,
618 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he common law of trusts informs duties of an ERISA fiduciary; at the same time, . . . fiduciary's duties are circumscribed by Congress' overriding
goal of ensuring 'the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds
to pay promised benefits."' (citing 29 U.S.C. § 10001 (1988))).
77. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4651.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
79. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
80. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added); see Martinez, 338 F.3d at 412.
81. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added). In other words, the prudent man standard is nothing more than a practical person who carefully and cautiously makes decisions based upon the circumstances. In the case of an employerfiduciary, this rule requires a higher standard of honesty and good faith towards those
to whom the employer-fiduciary owes such duties. For example, under ERISA the
prudent man rule governs investment of pension funds. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1294 (8th ed. 1999). This may consist of requiring the employer-fiduciary to invest the trust's or fund's money in certain listed securities designated by the state or
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as a fiduciary under ERISA, it must meet the prudent man standard
or possibly incur liability for breach of its fiduciary duties.83 Further,
as the Sixth Circuit points out, "[T]he duties charged to an ERISA
fiduciary are 'the highest known to the law."' 8 4

V.

THE

DUTY

OF LOYALTY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
DISCLOSE: THE Two HATS DOCTRINE

DUTY TO

By integrating hard-and-fast standards of trustee conduct into ERISA, Congress has incorporated the strict common-law standard of
loyalty that the courts consider to be the first and most fundamental
duty of an ERISA plan fiduciary." Under the duty of loyalty, which
requires a fiduciary to discharge his duties in regard to a plan "solely
in the interest of participants and beneficiaries, '8 6 disclosure is required only when there are "material facts affecting the interest of the
beneficiary which [the fiduciary] knows the beneficiary does not
know, [but] needs to know for his protection."8 7 For instance, in
Varity Corp. v. Howe,8 8 the Supreme Court found that a plan fiduciary
who "participate[s] knowingly and significantly in deceiving a plan's
beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries'
expense is not [ ] act[ing] 'solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries,'"89 and thus breaches its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
federal government, or simply require the employer-fiduciary to seek reasonable
means of preserving the fund's capital and/or wisely investing the funds to prevent
losses. See id. at 1264.
83. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 503 (1996) (holding that the
employer-fiduciary was acting in its fiduciary capacity under ERISA when it misrepresented employee benefits would remain secure provided the employees voluntarily
transferred to newly incorporated subsidiary); Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., N.A., 240 F.
Supp. 2d 832, 836 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (defining a fiduciary under ERISA to be "a person
who exercises any power of control, management, or disposition with respect to monies or other property of an employee benefit fund, or has the authority or responsibility to do so" and "[u]nder this definition, a showing of authority or control requires
'actual decision-making power' rather than the type of influence that a professional
advisor may have with respect to decisions to be made by the trustees or fiduciaries
that it advises").
84. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 426 (6th Cir. 2002). When enforcing these important responsibilities, we "focus[ I not only on the merits of the transaction, but also on the thoroughness of the investigation into the merits of the
transaction." Id. (citing Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996)).
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000); see also Enron Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511,
546 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that "[t]he most fundamental duty of ERISA plan fiduciaries is duty of complete loyalty").
86. § 1104(a)(1).
87. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Bintz, supra note 22, at 985 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt.

3 (1959))).
88. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
89. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506; see Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Lying is inconsistent with the duty of
loyalty owed by all fiduciaries and codified in section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
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plan beneficiary.9" However, whether an employer-fiduciary has to
disclose potential changes to benefit plan provisions is a more complicated issue. As noted above, since ERISA allows employers to act as
a plan's administrator, the employer is in a precarious position of potentially conflicting loyalties and must balance its duty of loyalty to
the plan participants against the loyalty it owes the company. 91 The
Supreme Court developed its "two hats" doctrine to assist in resolving
this potential conflict.9 2
Unlike traditional trust law that prohibits or severely restricts the
actions of conflicted fiduciaries, 93 the Supreme Court has explicitly accepted the argument that ERISA permits plan sponsors to act both as
plan fiduciaries and as nonfiduciaries (i.e., employers). 94 This acceptance of such dual roles for employer-fiduciaries, dubbed the "two
hats" doctrine, 95 shields an employer-while wearing its nonfiduciary/
employer hat-from fiduciary liability when it is making fundamental
business decisions.96
Under § 3(21)(A) of ERISA, an employer wears its "fiduciary" hat
only "to the extent" it performs one of the defined fiduciary functions. 97 In Pegram v. Hendrich,98 the Supreme Court agreed, stating
that:
In every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, then, the
threshold question is not whether the actions of some person employed to provide services under a plan adversely affected a plan
beneficiary's interest, but whether that person was acting as a fiduciary ... when taking on the action subject to complaint. 99
Courts, in interpreting this language, have held that a person who accepts only limited fiduciary duties is not a fiduciary for all purposes. 10 0
§ 1104(a)(1)."); see also Cent. States v. Cent. Transp., 472 U.S. 570, 570-71 (noting
ERISA fiduciary duty includes common-law duty of loyalty).
90. Varity, 516 U.S. at 506.
91. Pegram v. Hendrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000).
92. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 412.
93. See, e.g., Varity, 516 U.S. at 498 (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,
329-30 (1981) (indicating traditional trust law prohibits conflict of interest created by
fiduciaries holding certain types of positions)).
94. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 498.
95. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting
the Supreme Court created the "two hats" doctrine).
96. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 551 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting
fundamental business decisions such as the decision to establish a plan, how to design
or amend a plan, or when to terminate a plan are not within the scope of fiduciary
obligations of a fiduciary-employer).
97. See Stover, supra note 5, at 698 n.44, 714-19.
98. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
99. Id. at 226.
100. See, e.g., Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998)
(stating that "fiduciary status is not an all or nothing proposition"); Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 19 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A person 'is a fiduciary to the
extent that' he performs one of the described duties."); see also Hozier v. Midwest
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Fiduciary duties under ERISA
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In this light, courts have ruled that corporations or their directors are
not performing fiduciary roles even when their actions affect a plan; 01
that insurers, while incurring fiduciary status by adjudicating claims,
will not necessarily obtain fiduciary capacity for other administrative
aspects of the plan; 10 2 and that employers who make certain plan decisions, such as plan amendments, in their "employer" or "settlor" functions will not be held to be wearing their "fiduciary" hat. 0 3 In such
cases, courts use the "to the extent" limitation language found in
§ 3(21)(A) to anchor their lack of fiduciary responsibility decisions. 0 4

The courts reason this limiting language is intended to prevent the
"eros[ion] of the well-established principle that employers are free to
make decisions that modify, amend, or even terminate their employees' unvested welfare benefits."'0 5 Thus, in order to state a claim for
breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendants were fiduciaries and that they breached their fiduciary

obligations.

attach not just to particular persons, but to particular persons performing particular
functions.").
101. See Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 156 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
fact that an action taken by an employer to implement a business decision may ultimately affect the security of employees' welfare benefits does not automatically
render the action subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties.").
102. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (holding that Plan sponsors who alter terms of welfare benefit or pension plans do not fall into category of
"fiduciaries" under ERISA); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 61
(4th Cir. 1992); see also Srien v. Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 93 F.3d 1088,
1096 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding insurer not fiduciary when negotiating for premium rates
with trust); Walker v. Nat'l City Bank of Minneapolis, 18 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting no duty on part of trustee bank to notify participants of employer's failure to
make promised contributions). But see Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344
F.3d 381, 385 (2003) (finding a higher standard of review required because there is a
structural or inherent conflict of interest where insurer of an ERISA plan also acts as
claims administrator).
103. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999) (applying
rule to amendment of an employee contribution plan); Spink, 517 U.S. at 890 (noting
an employer is not engaged in plan administration and thus not acting as a fiduciary
when it decides to create, amend, or terminate its pension plans); Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (finding the same as to employee
welfare or benefit plans); Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding "a
company is only subject to fiduciary restrictions when managing a plan according to
its terms, but not when it decides what those terms are to be"); Schulist v. Blue Cross
of Iowa, 717 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding health insurers were not
fiduciaries under ERISA with respect to the setting of the rates charged to the union
when they did not exercise discretionary authority with respect to the setting of such
rates and, therefore, owed no fiduciary duty to the trust with respect to premium
charges).
104. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 527 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder ERISA [§ 3(21)(A)(iii)], a person 'is a fiduciary with respect to a plan'
only 'to the extent' that 'he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan."').
105. Sengpiel, 156 F.3d at 666.
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VI.

FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF THE EMPLOYER-FIDUCIARY

A.

Varity and the Duty to Tell the Truth

The Supreme Court has not spoken directly on when a plan fiduciary has a duty to tell the truth, 0 6 and the various circuit courts' decisions are, as one commentator has noted, in a "continuum of disarray"
on the issue.1i 7 However, the Supreme Court, in Varity Corp. v.
Howe, has generally defined when an employer is required to0 8 tell the
truth in connection with proposed changes to plan benefits.1
In Varity, subsidiary employees sued Varity Corporation (Varity),
their employer and plan administrator, alleging that the company affirmatively misled its employees by tricking them into losing their
nonpension benefits.' 0 9 In order to consolidate its various debts,
Varity transferred its money-losing divisions into a single subsidiary,
Massey Combines, with a forward-looking business plan under which
Massey Combines would likely fail." 0 Thus, Varity would eliminate
the consolidated debts for which its other divisions would have been
responsible.'

Part of the debt Varity sought to rid itself of was the

obligation to pay nonpension benefits (including medical benefits) to
the employees of Massey-Ferguson's money-losing divisions."' With
these goals in mind, Varity held a meeting with the employees of those
money-losing divisions to encourage them to move to Massey Combines and change benefit plans." 3 Varity, through its plan administrator (Massey-Ferguson) conveyed the basic promise that the
employees' plans would remain secure if they transferred to the new
subsidiary." 4 Based on these assurances, approximately 1,500 Massey-Ferguson employees transferred to Massey Combines, which
within two years went into receivership, causing the employees to lose
their nonpension benefits." 5
The Supreme Court, in determining whether Varity breached any
fiduciary duty it may have owed plaintiffs, first recognized that ERISA does set forth certain fiduciary duties to the management of such
plans." 16 At the same time, the Supreme Court also acknowledged the
twin aims of Congress in enacting ERISA, admonishing the courts to
begin their analysis with "trust law. . . only [as] a starting point, after
which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the lan106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2003).
Daniel M. Nimtz, ERISA Plan Changes, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 891, 894 (1998).
See generally Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id. at 496.
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guage of the statute, its structure, or its
purposes require departing
117
from common-law trust requirements.
After determining ERISA's applicability," 8 the Varity Court explained that the next step in the analysis is to determine when an employer is wearing its fiduciary hat under ERISA." 9 Varity argued that
its communications with the Massey-Ferguson employees about transferring to Massey Combine was strictly in the capacity as an employer
and not as a plan administrator.1 20 Unconvinced, the Court found
that the purpose behind the meeting was to assure the employees that
the transfer would not harm the employees' benefits and, as such,
Varity was acting as the plan's administrator (i.e., wearing its fiduciary
hat). 2 1 The Court explained that in making this determination, "we
must interpret the statutory terms which limit the scope of fiduciary
activity to discretionary acts of plan 'management' and 'administration,"' as "[t]hese words are not self-defining" in this instance.1 22
Turning to the common law of trusts to explain its reasoning, the
Court noted:
The ordinary trust law understanding of fiduciary "administration"
of a trust is that to act as an administrator is to perform the duties
imposed, or exercise the power conferred, by the trust documents.
The law of trusts also understands a trust document to implicitly
confer "such powers as are necessary
or appropriate for the carrying
2
out of the purposes" of the trust. 1
Thus, when an employer communicates to plan beneficiaries about the
future of plan benefits, which allows those beneficiaries to make informed decisions, the Court concluded that this seems "to be an exercise of a ' 24
power 'appropriate' to carrying out an important plan
1
purpose.'

The Court noted that by voluntarily calling the meeting in which
Varity reassured employees about the security of their future benefits,
Varity exercised its discretionary authority with respect to the plan's
administration or management when it made those misrepresentations. 25 The Court refused to accept Varity's argument that it was not
acting in a fiduciary capacity since neither ERISA's specific disclosure
requirements, nor the plan instruments required it to make these
117. Id. at 497.
118. Id. at 496.
119. Id. at 498. The Varity Court, quoting ERISA § 3(21)(A), noted that ERISA
raises an employer to the status of fiduciary "'to the extent' that he or she 'exercises
any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management' of the
plan, or 'has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration' of the plan." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 501.
122. Id. at 502.
123. Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 498.
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statements. 126 The Court explained that the primary function of fiduciary duty was "to constrain the exercise of discretionary powers
which are controlled by no other specific duty imposed by the trust
instrument127 or the legal regime"; otherwise, "it would serve no
purpose."
In finding that Varity was acting in its fiduciary capacity during the
meeting, the Court held that Varity willfully misrepresented material
facts and, as such, the company affirmatively breached its fiduciary
duty128 and violated the duty of loyalty it owed the plaintiffs under
ERISA. 1 29 The Court concluded by noting that in light of the facts,
there was nothing that would insulate Varity from the legal consequences for the intentional breach of its fiduciary duties. 3 °
For our purposes, the important point to take from Varity is the
acknowledgment that ERISA's disclosure requirements do not, in and
of themselves, require that an employer disclose information regarding the future of a plan benefit."' This is a purely discretionaryact. 3 2
However, once an employer chooses to inform its employees of the
fiduciary and thereby is
future status of a benefit plan, it is acting as a 34
1 33
under a fiduciary duty to speak truthfully.
B.

Development of the Serious ConsiderationDoctrine

Employers brought away from the Varity decision the knowledge
that should they voluntarily communicate in their fiduciary capacity
with plan participants, they must do so truthfully. 135 However, the
Varity decision left open the issue of when does the duty to speak
truthfully arise in such cases?
1. The Sixth Circuit
In 1988, the Sixth Circuit first addressed the issue of an employer's
fiduciary obligations when it is considering implementing an enhanced
benefits plan.' 36 In Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,1 37 the Sixth
Circuit established a limited duty under which an employer-fiduciary,
if they chose to speak about prospective plans, had to avoid misrepre126. Id. The Court further noted that reasonable employees "could have thought
that Varity was communicating with them both in its capacity as employer and in its
capacity as plan administrator." Id. at 503.
127. Id. at 504.
128. Id. at 506.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 2003).
132. Id.
133. See 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (2000) (stating that fiduciary duty is the duty to act
"solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries").
134. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 416.
135. See generally Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
136. See Berlihi v. Mich. Bell Tele. Co., 855 F.2d 1154, 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
137. 855 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
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sentations about the availability of those future incentive plans. a38 In
Berlin, employees who retired before a second offering of severance
plan benefits brought a class action against Michigan Bell Telephone
(MBT). 3 9 Plaintiffs complained that MBT, in its capacity as an employer-fiduciary, materially misrepresented the existence of a second
offer and, as such, denied them retirement benefits under the better,
second plan.140 Briefly, MBT offered an initial early retirement incentive package and later a second, more generous plan to management
level employees. 14 ' To discourage employees from delaying acceptance of the first plan with hope of a better second offering, MBT sent
out bulletins and made statements during meetings advising that no
additional offers of the enhanced retirement incentive program would
be made. 4 a Some MBT employees, based upon these representations, took the first offer and retired. 43
The Berlin court began its analysis with a review of ERISA's fiduciary duties 4 4 to determine whether MBT violated a fiduciary duty to

the plan participants in making those misleading statements. 45 While
acknowledging that an exclusion from such fiduciary duties does exist
for the employer-fiduciary making business decisions, 46 the Berlin
court noted that several courts have "held that misleading communications to plan participants regarding plan administration," such as
"eligibility under a plan ... [or] . . . the extent of benefits under a
plan," likely "support[s] a claim for breach of fiduciary duty."' 4 7 The

Berlin court extracted from these holdings the standard that under
ERISA "a fiduciary may not materially mislead those to whom the
duties of loyalty and prudence are owed"' 148 by reasoning that "when

serious consideration was given" to the implementation of the second
offering, the plan administrator "had a fiduciary duty not to make
misrepresentations, either negligently or intentionally, to potential
plan participants concerning the second offering."' 49 The court dismissed MBT's defense that no misrepresentations were possible prior
to its final decision to make the second offering since "any pre-deci138. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 417 (5th Cir. 2003).
139. See Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1156.
140. Id. at 1158.
141. Id. at 1157.
142. Id. at 1158-59.
143. Id. at 1158.
144. See id. at 1162.
145. Id. (noting the three essential components of the fiduciary requirements under
ERISA to be (1) the duty of loyalty, (2) the "prudent man" fiduciary duty, and (3)
"for the exclusive purpose" requirement).
146. Id. at 1163 (indicating employer is not acting as fiduciary when as plan administrator seeking to reduce unaccrued plan benefits, terminating a pension plan, or
establishing a plan).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1163-64.
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sion communications [would] be nothing more than predictions."
They concluded that "this distinction goes to materiality rather than to
the definition of 'misrepresentation"' 5 0 and found that the company
could be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty because of its alleged
misrepresentations.' 5
The Berlin court, however, limited its ruling to "those instances
where employers are accused with affirmatively misrepresenting the
possibility of future benefits, '1 5 2 while at the same time refusing to
hold that an employer-fiduciary has "an affirmative duty to communicate any information about future plans to its employees, either
before or after it gave serious consideration to those potential programs.' 53 The Berlin court further failed to define "serious consideration" or explain why it drew the line at this point.' 4 Yet, it was the
first court to voice the serious consideration test, and this test would
choice by the majority of the circuit courts
later become the test of
1 55
dealing with this issue.
Three years later, in Drennan v. General Motors Corp.,156 the Sixth
Circuit expanded the serious consideration test, essentially morphing
the duty not to misrepresent material facts into an affirmative duty to
tell the truth. 5 7 The Drennan court held that not only does an employer have a duty to avoid material misrepresentations about future
plan changes, 58 the employer also a duty to inform a plan participant
or beneficiary of "any new and relevant information as it arises."' 5 9
As one commentator noted, it appears that the Sixth Circuit would
likely not require an employer-fiduciary to disclose the exact details of
the decision-making process, but could be required to disclose that
changes to a plan are being considered.1 6
In later cases, the Sixth Circuit established a test for determining
serious consideration.' 6 ' In Muse v. InternationalBusiness Machines
150. Id. at 1164 n.7.
151. See id. at 1163-64.
152. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 417 (5th Cir. 2003).
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 10 (circuit court decisions supporting the serious consideration
test).
156. Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1992).
157. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 418.
158. Drennan, 977 F.2d at 251 (citing Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tele. Co., 858 F.2d 1154,
1164 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he duty to avoid material representations does not require
the employers to predict an ultimate decision to offer a plan so long as it fairly discloses the progress of its serious considerations to make a plan available to affected
employees.").
159. Drennan, 977 F.2d at 251 (citing Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America,
919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that not only does a fiduciary "ha[ve] a
duty to inform a beneficiary of new and relevant information as it arises, but also to
advise him of circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the relationship")).
160. Bintz, supra note 22, at 995.
161. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 421 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Corp.,1 62

the Sixth Circuit held that the employees' complaint failed
because of their failure to show that IBM (their employer) was seriously considering a better plan and purposely deceived them about its
intentions. 63 The Muse court reasoned that serious consideration will
only apply once the company "focuses on a particular plan for a particular purpose. ' In 1999, the Sixth Circuit, in McAuley v. International Business Machines Corp.,165 combined its "particular plan for a
particular purpose"1' 66standard with the Fischer II "three-part serious
consideration test.'

2. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit followed Berlin, but expanded on the Drennan
decision, holding in Fischer v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co. (Fischer )167

that an employer has both a duty to provide correct information regarding potential plans under serious consideration and an affirmative
duty to disclose, if asked, the terms of such a plan provided it is being
seriously considered. 168 Later, when the Third Circuit took up the
case once again on appeal in Fischer 11,169 it created a three-part test
noting that there is serious consideration of a plan when there exists:
"(1) a specific proposal (2) [ ] being discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to implement
the change."' 170
In the Fischer cases, the plaintiffs sued their former employer, Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECo) alleging that the utility had breached its
fiduciary duty under ERISA, as "PECo had denied, or failed to disclose when asked, that it was seriously considering an early retirement
program.' 17 1 The plaintiffs testified that prior to retiring they inquired whether the utility was considering implementing a new early
retirement incentive plan, but that the benefit counselors said no such
plan was being considered, despite the rumors circulating about such a
162. 103 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 495.
164. Id. at 494. This standard is often referred to as the "particular plan for a particular purpose" test. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 422.
165. 165 F.3d 1038 (6th Cir. 1999).
166. Id. at 1043-45.
167. 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1993).
168. See id. at 135. Expanding upon Drennan, the FischerI court defined "material
misrepresentation" to mean that "a misrepresentation is material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately
informed decision about if and when to retire." Id.
169. See Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1536 (3d Cir. 1996).
170. See id. at 1539.
171. Id. at 1536. Plaintiffs were past employees who retired just before PECo implemented its early retirement incentive program. Id.
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possible plan being implemented. 7 2 Shortly after the 173
plaintiffs retired, PECo implemented its early retirement program.
The district court granted summary judgment in PECo's favor and
the plaintiffs appealed. 1 74 In Fischer I, the Third Circuit-relying on
the decision in Drennan-concluded that while an ERISA fiduciary
has no duty to provide "precise predictions" as to future plan changes,
it must still candidly answer participants' questions without making
affirmative material misrepresentations. 75 At the same time, the
Fischer I court noted that this duty of disclosure, however, does not
necessitate the employer-fiduciary "to disclose its internal deliberations nor interfere with the substantive aspects of the [collective] bargaining process. "176 It went on to develop the Drennan definition of
"material misrepresentation" by providing that a misrepresentation
would be considered material where there was a "substantial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed decision about if and when to retire.' 7 7 The Third
Circuit reasoned that serious consideration was a relevant factor and
that "all else equal, the more seriously a plan is being considered, the
more likely a misrepresentation.' 1 78 The court remanded the case to
consider how seriously PECo had been considering its early retirement package at the time plaintiffs made their inquiries.' 7 9
On remand, the district court found that PECo had started to seriously consider the early retirement plan during the time plaintiffs
were making their inquiries and entered judgment in plaintiffs'
favor.' 80 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, explaining that the
district court had failed to properly apply the serious consideration
standard. 8 ' Once again, the Third Circuit turned its attention to the
serious consideration issue. 182 The court explained that where the
question is one of misrepresentation relating to proposed plan
172. See Fischer, 994 F.2d at 132.
173. Id. Between July 1989 and April 1990, PECo began looking for ways to reduce its costs. Id. at 131. In a December 1989 speech on the "state of the company,"
PECo's CEO alluded to the possibility of offering an early retirement plan. Id. at
131-32. In April 1990, PECo's CEO, although not yet voted on by PECo's Board of
Directors, stated that recommendations would be made for implementing an early
retirement plan. Id. The recommendation was approved on May 25, 1990 and affected those who would elect to retire between July 15 and September 15, 1990. Id.
The plaintiffs included those employees who asked about the rumors of an early retirement incentive and who were told no retirement plan was being considered. Id.
Each of the plaintiffs retired prior to the May 25, 1990 announcement. Id.
174. Id. at 131.
175. Id. at 135.
176. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1536 (3d Cir. 1996).
181. See id. at 1536.
182. See id. at 1538.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

21

Texas Wesleyan
Review, Vol. 11
[2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 11
LAW
REVIEW
TEXAS Law
WESLEYAN

[Vol. 11

changes, "the only factor at issue is the degree of seriousness with
'
which the change was in fact being considered."183
The court further
explained that this factor controls the materiality test: "[T]he more
seriously a plan change is being considered, the more likely a misrepresentation.., will pass the threshold of materiality." '8 4 Thus, serious
consideration forms the crux of the inquiry.
The Fischer I court clarified that the holding in Fischer I only requires disclosure when proposed benefit changes are under serious
consideration. 85 The court sought to explain the dueling policies behind the concept of "serious consideration" by noting that the concept
acknowledges and tones down the tensions that exist between the
rights of an employee to information and an employer's day-to-day
operational needs. 186 The court noted the essential need of a business
to be free to make day-to-day decisions by effectively informing itself,
and strategizing and evaluating options would be severely hampered
87
by the requirement of full disclosure at every stage of its operations.1
In the same breath, the court noted that serious consideration establishes a standard that is not too low or too high and protects employees by providing them with material
information they can rely on in
1 88
making employment decisions.
As stated above, the FischerH court set out three factors for determining whether serious consideration of a plan existed: "(1) a specific
proposal (2) [which] is being discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to implement the
change."' 89 However, the court also observed that consistent with its
prior decision in Kurz v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,190 "this formulation does not turn on any single factor; the determination is inherently
fact-specific[,]"'' and "[1]ikewise, the factors themselves are not isolated criteria; the three interact' 92and coalesce to form a composite picture of serious consideration.'
The court, in turn, explained each of the test's three elements. 93
The first element, a specific proposal, distinguishes serious consideration from the antecedent steps of gathering information, developing strategies, and analyzing options. A company must necessarily
go through these preliminary steps before its deliberations can
reach the serious stage. This factor does not mean, however, that
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1539.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See 994 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 1993).
Fischer, 96 F.3d at 1539.
Id.
Id. at 1539-40.
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the proposal must describe the plan in its final form. A specific proposal can contain several alternatives, and the plan as finally implemented may differ somewhat from the proposal. What is required,
consistent with the overall test, is a specific proposal that is sufficiently concrete to support consideration by senior management for
the purpose of implementation.
The second element, discussion for implementation, further distinguishes serious consideration from the preliminary steps of gathering data and formulating strategy. It also protects the ability of
senior management to take a role in the early phases of the process
without automatically triggering a duty of disclosure. This factor
recognizes that a corporate executive can order an analysis of benefits alternatives or commission a comparative study without seriously considering implementing a change in benefits. Preliminary
stages may also require interaction among upper level management,
company personnel, and outside consultants. These discussions are
properly assigned to the preliminary stages of company deliberations. Consideration becomes serious when the subject turns to the
practicalities of implementation.
The final element, consideration by senior management with the authority to implement the change, ensures that the analysis of serious
consideration focuses on the proper actors within the corporate hierarchy. As noted, large corporate entities conduct regular or ongoing reviews of their benefit packages in their ordinary course of
business. These entities employ individuals, including middle and
upper-level management employees, to gather information and conduct reviews. The periodic review process may also entail contacting outside consultants or commissioning studies. During the
course of their employment, the employees assigned these tasks
necessarily discuss their duties and the results of their studies.
These discussions may include issues of implementation. The employees may also make recommendations to upper level management or senior executives. As a general rule, such operations will
not constitute serious consideration. These activities are merely the
ordinary duties of the employees. Until senior management194 addresses the issue, the company has not yet seriously considered a
change. 195

194. "Consideration by senior management is also limited to those executives who
possess the authority to implement the proposed change. This focus on authority can
be used to identify the proper cadre of senior management, but it should not limit
serious consideration to deliberations by a quorum of the Board of Directors, typically the only corporate body that in a literal sense has the power to implement
changes in benefits packages. It is sufficient for this factor that the plan be considered
by those members of senior management with responsibility for the benefits area of
the business, and who ultimately will make recommendations to the Board regarding
benefits operations." Id. at 1540.
195. Id. at 1539-40 (internal footnote added).
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The Tenth Circuit

In 1997, the Tenth Circuit also adopted the Fischer II serious consideration doctrine. In Hockett v. Sun Co.,196 a retired employee sued

his former employer for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA after a
new early retirement plan was announced less than two months after
the employee had retired.1 9 7 The plaintiff complained that Sun Co.

breached its fiduciary duty to him by failing to disclose, despite sev1 98
eral inquiries, the possibility of a new, enhanced retirement plan.
The court applied the Fischer II elements to this case and concluded

that Sun Co. had not seriously considered a future plan offering until
sometime after the plaintiff had decided to retire. 199 Because the
three elements of the FischerII test did not connect during the crucial
period, 2" no fiduciary duty to disclose existed. 0 1 The Hockett court

concluded that "the proper point on this continuum has already been
identified by the Third Circuit in Fischer H.... [and that] ... formulation appropriately narrows the range of instances in which an employer must disclose, in response to employees'
inquiries, its tentative
'202
intentions regarding an ERISA plan.
196. 109 F.3d 1515, 1524 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that serious consideration of a
severance plan did not occur until a meeting was convened that "gathered together
the heads of all departments related to employee benefits" to discuss a specific
proposal).
197. Id. at 1518.
198. Id. at 1521. Specifically, Hockett argued that company representatives knew
he was interested in retiring early and that he felt compelled to take the existing early
retirement package before he became ineligible; yet, they failed to inform him that a
new, better package was being considered at the time he made his inquiries. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1524. The crucial period for the court in determining material breach
was when the three serious consideration factors intersected-sometime in late July
or early August 1991. Id. Under the court's analysis, any statements made by company representatives concerning the availability of a package were immaterial prior to
July 1, 1991, the date plaintiff retired. Id. at 1519. Thus, for the majority, it is when
the company begins to seriously consider a specific plan that controls the materiality
issue, not necessarily the time frame between the employee's retirement and the announcement/implementation of the new plan. Id. at 1525.
201. Id. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that:
As a practical matter, an employer's "consideration" of an ERISA plan can
fall anywhere along a continuum, beginning with the most casual mention of
a possible plan change and ending, perhaps, with a formal vote by the Board
of Directors. Between these two extremes are many stages of research, analysis, and debate, which only some proposals will survive. "Serious consideration" marks the point on the continuum at which imposing fiduciary-related
duties will best serve the competing congressional purposes.
Id. at 1522.
202. Id. at 1523. However, the Tenth Circuit did note the same concerns voiced by
the Fischer courts that:
Employers frequently review retirement and benefit plans as part of ongoing
efforts to succeed in a competitive and volatile marketplace. If any discussion by management regarding possible change to an ERISA plan triggered
disclosure duties, the employer could be burdened with providing a constant,
ever-changing stream of information to inquisitive plan participants . . ..
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4.

The First Circuit

The First Circuit also adopted the Fischer H test in Vartanian v.
Monsanto Co.."3 In Vartanian, the plaintiff, a former employee of
Monsanto Chemical Company (Monsanto), alleged that Monsanto
misled him by failing to adequately respond to his inquiries, prior to
his retirement, concerning a potential severance package that was being considered by the company. 20 4 As a question of first impression
for the First Circuit, the court turned to its sister circuits for guidance
and adopted the Fischer H standard, but modified the test by changing
the first element to include that a specific proposal would have to "affect a person in the position of the plaintiff" in order to meet the
test.2 0 5 The First Circuit acknowledged concern over the standard by
stating, "It seems reasonable that where an allegation of positive misrepresentation is involved, that 'aspect of the assurance can render it
material regardless of whether future changes are under consideration
at the time the misstatement is made.'"26
5.

Materiality Under the Serious Consideration Standard

At the center in each of these cases is the issue of when misrepresented facts are considered "material" because where the materiality
factor is found, courts will generally hold an employer-fiduciary liable
for misrepresenting facts.2 0 7 As noted above, for the majority circuits,
a misrepresentation is material and, thus, actionable only when a company begins to seriously consider the plan change.20 8 For the majority,
serious consideration becomes important only during that crucial period when the three serious consideration factors intersect. 20 9 Thus,
for the majority, it is when the company begins to seriously consider a
specific plan that controls the materiality issue, not necessarily the
time frame between the employee's retirement and the announcement/implementation of the new plan.
And, most of such information actually would be useless, if not misleading,
to employees, considering that many corporate ideas and strategies never
reach maturity, or else metamorphose so dramatically along the way, that
early disclosure would be of little value ....
Furthermore, requiring employers to reveal too soon their internal deliberations to inquiring beneficiaries could seriously "impair the achievement of legitimate business goals"
by allowing competitors to know that the employer is considering a labor
reduction, a site-change, a merger, or some other strategic move.
Id.
203.
court's
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997) (adopting with modification the Fischer H
standard).
See id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 269.
Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 425 (5th Cir. 2003).
See id.
Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1524 (10th Cir. 1997).
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In total, the Third Circuit, along with its sister courts, the First,
Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth all agree that the Fischer H court's "serious
consideration" standard is the best test for determining when an employer-fiduciary has an affirmative duty to disclose material information related to proposed plan changes. 2 10 However, a minority of the
circuit courts have broken from the pack to hold that serious consideration, while an important factor, is but one of a number of factors to
consider in determining whether an employer-fiduciary has materially
breached its fiduciary duty to a plan participant.2 1 1
C.

The Fact-Specific Approach
1. The Second Circuit

Unlike the majority of its sister courts, the Second Circuit decided
to take another approach to the materiality issue in Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co.,212 by holding that "serious consideration" is but one
factor the courts should look at in determining whether an employer
can be held responsible for affirmatively misrepresenting potential enhancements to retirement plans.2 13 In Ballone, the plaintiffs claimed
that Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak) made affirmative misrepresentations that led them to believe that no enhanced pension plan would be
forthcoming in the months following their retirement.2 1 4 Shortly after
plaintiffs retired, Kodak implemented a pension plan with benefits exceeding those of plaintiffs' retirement plan.2 15 The district court
2 16
granted judgment to Kodak on plaintiffs' claims under § 1104(a)
and other related claims, concluding that because Kodak had not "seriously considered" changes to the retirement plan before plaintiffs
retired, Kodak's statements about future plan changes were neither
material nor misleading.2 1 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the Fischer II standard, concluding that "because Kodak allegedly assured [p]laintiffs that it had
ruled out plan changes for the immediate future, when in fact it had
not, the district court erred in determining that the absence of 'serious
consideration' of plan changes warranted judgment in Kodak's
210. See McAuley v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043-45 (6th Cir.
1999); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997); Hockett, 109 F.3d
at 1522; Fisher v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1538-41 (3d Cir. 1996); Muse v. Int'l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d
Cir. 1993); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992); Berlin v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988).
211. See Martinez, 338 F.3d at 422-24.
212. 109 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1997).
213. Id. at 123.
214. Id. at 120.
215. Id.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
217. Ballone, 109 F.3d at 120.
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favor. '2 18 Instead, the Ballone court reasoned that no prerequisite
bright-line rule exists, but rather "[wihether a plan is under serious
consideration is but one factor in the materiality inquiry. 2 19 In its
place, the Second Circuit adopted a fact-specific approach. 220 The
court stated that
[d]etermining the materiality of false assurances like those here alleged is fact-specific and will turn on a number of factors, including:
how significantly the statement misrepresents the present status of
internal deliberations regarding future plan changes, the special relationship of trust and confidence between the plan fiduciary and
beneficiary, whether the employee was aware of other information
or statements from the company tending to minimize the importance of the misrepresentation or should have been so aware, taking
into consideration the broad trust responsibilities owed by the plan
administrator to the employee and the employee's reliance on the
plan administrator for truthful information, and the specificity of the
assurance 2 . [as well as, of course, whether
222 the employer is seriously
considering altering its retirement plan.]
As such, these statements are "material if they would induce reasonable reliance. ' 22 3 Thus, the Ballone court concluded that, based upon
the principles of trust-law, Kodak "has a duty to deal fairly and honestly with its beneficiaries" and may not, regardless of whether or not
it is seriously considering future plan changes, actively misinform its
plan beneficiaries about the availability 22of4 future plan benefits in order to induce them into retiring earlier.
In defining the "materiality standard," the Second Circuit found
guidance in the securities laws. 225 Based on this definition,°the Ballone court found that "an assurance about the future that by necessary
implication misrepresents present facts is clearly actionable. '226 Thus,
the court instructed that should, upon remand, the district court "determine[ ] that Kodak made misrepresentations regarding future benefits, the availability to [p]laintiffs of truthful information countering
the misrepresentations will be relevant in determining if they reasona218. Id.
219. Id. at 123.
220. Id. at 125.
221. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 124.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 125 (citing Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1993) (noting "that courts have [through securities law] been guided by the following factors: (1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and
securities matters; (2) the existence of longstanding business or personal relationships;
(3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5)
concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7)...; and (8) the
generality or specificity of the misrepresentations")).
226. Id. at 124.
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bly relied on the misrepresentations," and, hence, whether the misrepresentations were material."2 7
2.

The Ninth Circuit

Three years later, the Ninth Circuit, faced with the issue of when an
employer-fiduciary has the duty to inform plan participants regarding
potential retirement incentive benefits, turned to its sister courts for
guidance.2 28 In Bins v. Exxon Co.,22 9 the plaintiff worked for Exxon,
U.S.A. (EUSA), a division of Exxon Corporation (Exxon) for 15
years.2 30 Before retiring, Bins asked whether EUSA planned on enhancing its retirement package as rumored, but never received a confirmation from the company.2 3 ' Shortly after Bins retired, EUSA
offered the rumored retirement incentive.23 2 Bins sued EUSA for
breach of its fiduciary duties. 33 The district court entered summary
judgment for EUSA and Bins appealed. 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Fishei H test best
accomplished the goal set out in Varity.23 5 The Bins court echoed
FischerH by emphasizing that the test "should not be applied so rigidly as to distract attention from the core inquiry, which must always
be whether the employer-fiduciary has violated its fiduciary duty of
loyalty to plan
participants by failing to disclose material
2 36
information.
The Ninth Circuit once again took up the issue in Wayne v. Pacific
Bell,2 37 wherein it narrowed the holding in Bins by noting that the
serious consideration test applied only to claims where employers
breached their fiduciary duties not to disclose their consideration of a
plan change.2 38 The Bins court found the Ballone rule to be more
appropriate.2 39 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ended up utilizing a "twotiered approach" in regard to an employer's fiduciary duty to
disclose. 40
227. Id. at 126.
228. See Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
229. Id. at 1042.
230. Id. at 1045.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1047.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1049. Under Varity, an employer has a fiduciary duty to communicate
information about the future of plan benefits, while at the same time balancing the
employer's interest by not unduly burdening it with the responsibility of constant progress reports regarding its consideration of potential plans and plan changes. Id. at
1048.
236. Id. at 1049.
237. 238 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001).
238. Id. at 1050-51.
239. Id. at 1055-56.
240. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 424 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting
the two-tiered approach used by the 9th Circuit derived from its adoption of the
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3.

The Fifth Circuit

In 2003, the Fifth Circuit became the newest court to consider the
issue of whether an employer-fiduciary has an affirmative duty to
truthfully disclose potential plan changes.2 4 ' The Fifth Circuit rejected the bright-line "serious consideration" test used by the majority
of circuits in determining whether an employer has a duty, upon inquiry, under ERISA to disclose future plan changes.2 42 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's "fact-specific" approach
which takes into account whether employees would consider the information material in making benefit-related decisions.2 43
In Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd. ,244 long-time employees of
Schlumberger Ltd. and Schlumberger Technology Corp. (Schlumberger) sued the company for fraud, fraudulent inducement, and negligence/gross negligence, alleging that Schlumberger breached the
fiduciary duty it owed them as plan participants. 245 The plaintiffs argued that, despite direct inquiry as to whether the company planned
on offering an enhanced voluntary early retirement plan (VERP), the
company and its employees denied any knowledge of such a plan.2 46
In a matter of weeks after the plaintiffs retired, Schlumberger announced a new enhanced VERP.2 47 The trial court applied the serious consideration test to find that the employer was not seriously
considering the VERP until after the plaintiff retired.2 4 8 As a result,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. 4 9
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Ballone court's "fact-specific" standard for materiality. 2 50 The Martinez court took a two-step
approach to determine whether an employer-fiduciary has "a duty to
truthfully disclose, upon inquiry from plan participants or beneficiaries, [when] it is considering amending the benefit plan., 25 1 First,
the court considered whether an employer, when it freely chooses to
speak about potential plans changes, has a fiduciary duty to speak
truthfully (and, if so, when does that duty arise).2 52 Second, the court
FischerII serious consideration test in Bins v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1055
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and its clarification of Bins in Wayne v. Pacific Bell, 238
F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), wherein it narrowed the test to apply only to claims in
which employers breach their fiduciary duties not to disclose consideration of a plan
change).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 425.
243. See id.
244. 338 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2003).
245. Id. at 409.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 410.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 425.
251. Id. at 409.
252. Id. at 424.
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considered whether it should impose an affirmative duty upon the employer to disclose future plan changes (and, if so, at what point). 253 As
to the first issue, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the other circuit courts
that under ERISA an employer has "a fiduciary duty to refrain from
misrepresentations ... when an employer chooses, in its discretion, to
communicate about future plan benefits. '' 254 In response to the second issue, the court held that "no such duty exists. ' 255 The court concluded by reasoning:
We believe the two views we have promulgated-that an employer
has no affirmative duty to disclose the status of its internal deliberations on future plan changes even if it is seriously considering such
changes, but if it chooses in its discretion to speak it must do so
truthfully-coalesce to form a scheme that accomplishes Congress's
dual purposes in enacting ERISA of protecting employees' rights to
their benefits and encouraging employers to create benefit plans. 6
Based on its analysis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court, holding that under the court's analysis Schlumberger
had no affirmative duty to communicate the status of its internal deliberations regarding a possible plan enhancement when responding
to the inquiries of the three about-to-retire employees. 7 The court
concluded that the employer did not materially misrepresent the possibility of a change, even though a plan enhancement was to be rolled
out less than a month after the three plaintiffs had retired.25 8
4.

Materiality Under the Minority's Fact-Specific Approach

Unlike the majority circuits which consider a misrepresentation to
be material only when a company begins to seriously consider the plan
change,2 59 the minority circuits follow the Supreme Court's holding in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 2 1 In Basic, the Court rejected a bright-line
materiality standard such as the one used in the serious consideration
test.2 61 In shunning the idea that materiality was amenable to an easy
formula, the Court explicitly rejected the standard for materiality created by the Third Circuit, a standard very similar in many respects to
253. Id.
254. Id. at 424-25.
255. Id. at 428.
256. Id. at 430.
257. Id. at 431.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The plaintiffs in Basic complained that they were injured
when they sold their Basic shares at artificially depressed prices, relying on the defendants' misleading statements that the company was not engaged in merger negotiations when, in fact, it had been in talks with another company and accepted a tender
offer for all of its outstanding shares.
261. See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing
Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 238));
Martinez, 338 F.3d at 426, n.136.
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the Fischer II's definition of the "serious consideration" rule. 6 2 The
Court acknowledged that several reasonable rationales existed to support the Third Circuit's materiality standard, 6 3 but concluded that
none of them "purports to explain why drawing the line at agreementin-principle reflects the significance of the information upon the investor's decision. '"2" The Court reasoned that, in contrast to the Third
Circuit's test, any determination of materiality requires "delicate assessments of inferences" a reasonable person would draw "from a
2 65
given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him. 1
The Court concluded that it could not find valid justification "for artificially excluding from the definition of materiality information . . .
merely because agreement-in-principle . . . has not yet been
reached. 21 6 6 The Court further noted that "it is not enough that a
statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant."2'67
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Basic concurred with the Second
Circuit in its approach to materiality. 6 The Second Circuit recognized that "it was a fact-based inquiry and depended 'upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.' 2 69 At its center, "materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or
misrepresented information."2 7 Thus, as the Martinez court notes,
"Basic suggests that we are not to rely on a bright-line test to determine whether a company's alleged misrepresentations are
material." 7 1
The above review of the evolution of the scope of an employerfiduciary's duties regarding future plan changes brings us back to the
state of affairs as it exists today. It is obvious that the circuit courts
are unevenly split on the materiality issue. On the one side, a majority
of circuits holds to a bright-line "serious consideration" standard
while, on the other side, a minority of circuits holds to a "fact-specific"
approach in deciding the issue of an employer-fiduciary's duty to
262. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 237.
263. Id. at 233. The court rationalized that the standard answered the concern
"that an investor not be overwhelmed by excessively detailed and trivial information," assisted in "preserv[ing] the confidentiality of discussions," and "provide[d] a
usable, bright-line rule for determining when disclosure must be made." Id.
264. Id. at 234.
265. Id. at 236 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450
(1976)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 238.
268. Id.
269. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 428 (5th Cir. 2003) (referring to
Basic, 485 U.S. at 238).
270. Id.
271. Id.
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But, which is the

THE FACT-SPECIFIC APPROACH IS THE BETTER STANDARD

This Comment modestly proposes that the minority fact-specific approach is the better standard for evaluating the material breach of
employer-fiduciary duties under ERISA in the context of voluntary
communications regarding changes in retirement benefits. The majority's serious consideration standard is a bright-line test 73 which leaves
the door open for continuing abuse by employer-fiduciaries seeking to
advance the interests of the company over the interests of plan beneficiaries. While Congress originally sought to balance the conflicting
interests of the employer-fiduciary, its primary goal remains the protection of the plan participant.2 7 4 Yet, under the doctrine of serious
consideration, that balance swings in favor of the employer-fiduciary
and away from the plan participant.
Arguably, under the FischerII serious consideration test, the trio of
factors remains "relatively flexible. 27 5 In some situations, this "relative flexibility" may be enough to keep the delicate balance between
the employer-fiduciary's duties of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries and
the "best interests" loyalty the employer-fiduciary owes the company.27 6 However, the point remains that employers need only show
that a plan was not being seriously considered at the time it misrepresented facts (whether material or not) to retiring employees in order
to prove lack of materiality. 2 77 Under the majority's standard, the employer is then freed from liability under the fiduciary duties imposed
on all ERISA plan administrators. Thus, as long as the serious consideration test cannot be met, employers may lie with impunity.
However, the minority's fact-specific approach, in viewing the situation as a whole rather than from a set point in time, minimizes that
272. Compare Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996) (establishing
affirmative duty to tell the truth arises when plan is under serious consideration) with
Martinez, 338 F.3d at 428 and Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 124 (2d
Cir. 1997) (rejecting serious consideration standard for a more fact specific approach).
273. See Kristy Wrigley, Reconsidering "Serious Consideration": The Materiality
Debate Under ERISA, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.733, 742-45 (2004) [hereinafter

Wrigley] (arguing that the serious consideration is not a "bright-line" test and that the
three factors provide relative flexibility). But see Martinez, 338 F.3d at 425-28
(describing the Fisher II serious consideration standard as a "bright-line" test).
274. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
275. Wrigley, supra note 268, at 752.
276. See Stover, supra note 5, at 690.
277. See, e.g., McAuley v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043-45 (6th Cir.
1999); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997); Hockett v. Sun
Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997); Fischer, 96 F.3d at 1541-43; Muse v. Int'l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d
Cir. 1993); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992); Berlin v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988).
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hole. As the Fifth Circuit succinctly points out, there is "no reasoned
justification for drawing the line at that point and time. '2 78 The
courts, by incorporating the serious consideration standard as merely
one of several factors to look to in determining an employer-fiduciary's breach of its duty of loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries,2 79 force the employer-fiduciary to carefully consider its
voluntary communications to plan participants. It places the duty to
speak truthfully squarely back in the employer's lap and, as such,
meets Congress's first and foremost goal under ERISA-protecting
employee pensions and other benefits.28 °
It has been argued that the minority's fact-specific approach may
not be practical because it could be considered "amorphous and excessively flexible, 28 1 and could "be stretched in favor of employers."2 82 Yet, it is this very flexibility which provides the minority
standard its strength. Under the serious consideration standard, the
courts need not look at all or even a majority of the relevant factors
which make up the allegations of the case, but merely decide whether
a plan was being "seriously considered" by the highest echelons of the
company's management at the time of the misrepresentation. 8 3 Such
diminutive telescoping of the facts to this limited time-frame, while it
eases the burden on the employer, defeats the policy ERISA sought to
embrace: the protection of plan participants and their retirement benefits. 284 Moreover, under the principles of trust law, an employer-fiduciary "has a duty to deal fairly and honestly with its beneficiaries"
and therefore may not, regardless of whether it is seriously considering future plan changes, actively misinform its plan beneficiaries about
the availability of future plan benefits in order to induce them into
retiring earlier.2 85 However, under the serious consideration stan278. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 425 (5th Cir. 2003).
279. Id.
280. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
281. Wrigley, supra note 268, at 751.
282. Id. (citing Joseph E. Czerniawski, Bins v. Exxon: Affirmative Duties To Disclose ProposedBenefit Changes in the Absence of Employee Inquiry, 76 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 783, 811 (2001)). In turn, it should be noted that a court which finds itself
sympathetic to business can find a way to favorably "stretch" the facts to find that a
company had not been "seriously considering" a plan and, thus, find in favor of the
employer.
283. See Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 855 F.2d 1154, 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
284. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
285. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 423 (5th Cir. 2003). One commentator, noting that the minority relies on Basic, a securities case, in defining the
materiality standard stated that "[fjortunately for employers, the concerns set forth by
the court in Basic are irrelevant in the ERISA context" as ERISA is based on the law
of trusts. See Wrigley, supra note 268, at 749. This is a fallacy. The Second Circuit in
Ballone fully acknowledged the difference "between the duty of full disclosure under
the securities laws and the disclosure obligations imposed on employers under ERISA
[noting courts should] refer . .. to securities law precedent only insofar as it is
[..
relevant to determining the materiality of affirmative misrepresentations." Ballone v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 124 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997). The Ballone court's use of
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dard, employer-fiduciaries may actively misinform their plan beneficiaries up and to that bright point in time where a court determines a
specific plan is being "seriously considered."
It is true employer-fiduciaries find themselves in a difficult position,
stretched between their duty of loyalty to the company and their fiduciary duties to plan participants.28 6 It is the nature of business to seek
profit. Thus, it is only natural for employers to seek ways to increase
their profit margins. As Sophocles remarked, "Profit is sweet, even if
it comes from deception. '28 7 It is this very deception Congress,
through ERISA, seeks to dispel. 2 8 The often told Bible story of
"David and Goliath "289 appears apropos in this instance. David, without his stones, would have had no chance of defeating Goliath, for an
empty sling is a useless weapon. Before ERISA, plan participants had
little in way of protection against employers who, at best through negligence, or at worst through willful deceit, cost employees their retirement plans. 29' ERISA, with its reporting and disclosure requirements
and fiduciary duties, provides plan participants with protection when
and if they need it. The minority's standard is just another "stone"
providing the plan participant added security, by requiring the duty
bound employer-fiduciary at all times to adhere to a policy of honesty
and fair dealing when it voluntarily communicates about potential
plan changes.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Congress drafted ERISA to protect the interests of employees like
Employee A from employers who place their financial duty to the
29 1
company over their fiduciary duty of loyalty owed plan participants.
When courts apply the serious consideration test to ERISA pension
cases, they furnish employer-fiduciaries such as Employer Z continuing opportunities to situate the company's welfare over that of the
plan participants. Because employers are not required to inform plan
participants of potential changes to their retirement benefits until that
plan is under "serious consideration," the company often saves money
at their employees' expense. 92 Employers take advantage of the serianalogy is a time honored legal tool that courts and attorneys have used in memoriam
and does not, per se, make it "irrelevant."
286. See discussion supra, Part V (discussing the dual duties of the employerfiduciary).
287. Sophocles, Sophocles Collection, in The Columbia World of Quotations, 54781
(Columbia University Press 1996) available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/81/54781
(on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
288. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
289. 1 Samuel 17 (King James).
290. See discussion supra, Part II.A-II.B (discussing the history of ERISA).
291. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001; see discussion supra,Part V (discussing the dual duties of
the employer-fiduciary).
292. See discussion supra, Part VI.B (discussing the "serious consideration" cases).
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ous consideration requirement by delaying decisions to the last minute, even lying about what stage a proposed plan may be in, to deny
retiring employees the opportunity to partake in future plan
changes.2 93
The minority's standard, on the other hand, closes the gap left open
under the Fisher H "serious consideration" standard by making serious consideration just one of a number of factors courts look to in
making a decision of whether an employer-fiduciary breached its duty
of loyalty to plan participants. 9 4 The result is the return of equilibrium in the balance between the dual duties and the satisfying of ERISA's primary goal of preventing serious abuse in the managing of
employee retirement benefits.2 95 Yet, until the Supreme Court
speaks, the circuit courts remain split and the courts and commentators will continue their spirited discourse over when an employer-fiduciary violates its fiduciary duty to be truthful in disclosing proposed
plan changes.
Sandra L. Sprott
293. Id.
294. See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1997) (listing
factors a court should look to in determining whether an employer-fiduciary breached
its fiduciary duties to plan participants).
295. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001; see also discussion supra, Part V (discussing the dual
duties of the fiduciary-employer).
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